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Abstract Various alterations to the Irish legal system have been effected in a bid to counter organised crime, 
the most radical of which was the introduction of civil forfeiture in 1996. This article examines the forfeiture 
process carried out by the Criminal Assets Bureau and seeks to analyse it from a theoretical perspective. 
Civil forfeiture may be regarded as embodying a move away from due process towards crime control, given 
the avoidance of traditional protections in the criminal process by its location in the civil realm. Moreover, the 
process may be characterised as an 'apersonal means of tackling crime', in which emphasis is laid on the 
non-moral and regulatory aspects of the law. This article further contends that civil forfeiture represents an 
adaptation to reality in which the State reconfigures the legislative framework so as to facilitate more readily 
the suppression of organised crime. 
The phenomenon of crime is a fundamental and ineluctable concern in contemporary Ireland, as it is in all 
late-modern Western societies, and its avoidance and prevention represents a pivotal organising factor in 
day-to-day life. The centrality of crime in Ireland in 2007 may be explained primarily by reference to the ex-
ponential increase in crime rates in the last number of decades: while crime rates reached unprecedented 
levels in the last 20 years, they have not diverged in any substantial sense from that position in recent times 
and remain at relatively stable levels.
2
 Moreover, notwithstanding any fluctuations in statistics, the general 
popular impression is that the problem of crime is an ever-worsening one. 
In particular, the 1990s in Ireland heralded an unprecedented wave of concern about serious and organised 
crime, with a concomitant surge of legislative action. The notable rise in 'gangland' killings in that decade, 
which are characterised by their planned nature and the use of firearms,
3
 coupled with the low conviction rate 
for such crimes,
4
 precipitated a widespread belief that organised criminals were evading justice.
5
 Further-
more, a pervasive sentiment that considerable wealth was being accrued and enjoyed by a number of noto-
rious criminals, and that the State was impotent in this regard, took root. These popular and political percep-
tions gathered momentum during the early 1990s, until action was fomented in 1996 as a result of two 
high-profile murders. 
Sustained outcry about organised crime in Ireland came in June 1996 in the wake of the murders of Garda 
Jerry McCabe in the course of an armed robbery, and of investigative journalist Veronica Guerin. These 
murders expedited the introduction of a number of legislative measures that significantly enhanced the capa-
bilities of the State, and fundamentally revised its strategy in tackling organised criminality. Popular and po-
litical will converged in a desire to undermine the power of the 'overlords'
6
 and 'godfathers'
7
 of organised 
crime, and to recoup their assets. As one member of the Dáil (legislature) insisted, if we 'as a community 
[are] prepared to tolerate the continued unhindered existence in our midst of people who have accumulated 
vast and unexplained wealth ... Veronica Guerin died in vain'.
8
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Following these two murders, a series of legislative provisions was introduced in a bid to further the State's 
ability to prosecute and control organised crime. For example, the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 
1996, which facilitates the detention of suspected drug-traffickers for seven days,
9
 and which allows infer-
ences to be drawn from the failure of accused to mention in police interview particular facts on which he later 
seeks to rely in court,
10
 was enacted. In addition, the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, which provides for a 
mechanism of civil asset forfeiture that is implemented by the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB),
11
 was intro-
duced. Remarkably, this Act was passed within a mere five weeks, in marked contrast with the generally 
slow legislative process in Ireland.
12
 Indeed, such expedition may stem from the perceived importance of 
such a mechanism: prior to its enactment it was claimed that the Proceeds of Crime Bill was necessary to 
protect democracy.
13
 
While the workings of the Criminal Assets Bureau and the notion of asset forfeiture in Ireland have been 
examined previously,
14
 this article seeks to expand on the extant literature by exploring this mechanism from 
a conceptual perspective. By placing forfeiture in a theoretical setting, it is hoped that its underlying ration-
ales will be clarified. As Garland notes, 'theoretical argument enables us to think about that real world of 
practice with a clarity and a breadth of perspective often unavailable to the hard-pressed practitioner'.
15
 
Moreover, while this article uses the Irish forfeiture model as the basis for its theoretical study, the analysis is 
applicable to equivalent or related tactics in other jurisdictions. 
However, before undertaking a theoretical exploration of asset forfeiture, it is useful to revisit its procedural 
aspects and the different templates for this tactic in the Irish context. Then, the nature and effects of asset 
forfeiture in Ireland will be examined to determine if the process is criminal or civil. The remainder of the arti-
cle will focus on a number of theoretical insights which may clarify the development and implementation of 
this innovative approach to tackling organised and serious crime. 
 
Procedural aspects of asset forfeiture in Ireland 
 
The introduction of civil forfeiture represented a radical alteration to the tactics adopted by the Irish State in 
tackling organised crime. While legislation facilitating the confiscation of a convicted offender's property was 
already in place prior to 1996,
16
 the model introduced by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 allows for the sei-
zure and forfeiture of property deemed to be the proceeds of crime
17
 in the absence of a criminal conviction. 
Upon an application by CAB, the High Court may issue an interim order that prohibits any person from dis-
posing of or dealing with property worth at least j13,000, which is believed to be the proceeds of crime, for 21 
days.
18
 This interim order lapses after 21 days unless an application for an interlocutory order is made,
19
 and 
the court must make an interlocutory order unless the respondent refutes the contention that the property is 
the proceeds of crime, or if there would be a serious risk of injustice. Finally, where an interlocutory order has 
been in force for not less than seven years, the High Court may make a disposal order under s. 4 of the 1996 
Act which deprives the respondent of his rights in the property and transfers the property to the Minister for 
Finance.
20
 Significantly, the standard of proof required in an application for an order under the Proceeds of 
Crime legislation is the civil burden of proof, and hearsay evidence is admissible in an application for an or-
der under the Act if the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for that belief.
21
 
Next, two important exemplars for forfeiture in Ireland will be examined. While the American forfeiture pro-
cess is frequently highlighted as the template from which the current Irish model derives, a measure intro-
duced to combat subversive crime in Ireland also provided a valuable model for the present approach. 
 
Templates for the Irish model of asset forfeiture 
 
In the early 1970s the US Congress passed a number of legislative measures which sought to undercut the 
influence and power of organised crime by removing the assets of those involved in such criminality,
22
 the 
most well known of which is the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organisations Statute (RICO).
23
 Prior to the 
enactment of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, RICO was expressly cited in the Dáil as a model on which 
comparable Irish legislation should be based.
24
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However, the present forfeiture scheme is not based solely on the experience of the US, but is also influ-
enced by a provision on the Irish statute book which authorised the forfeiture of the assets of an illegal or-
ganisation. Section 2 of the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1985 allowed the Minister for Jus-
tice to freeze moneys held by a bank which he believed to be the property of an unlawful organisation, and 
cause the moneys to be paid to the High Court.
25
 After a period of six months, the Minister could make an ex 
parte application to the High Court directing that the moneys be paid to him. However, the person claiming to 
be the owner of the property could also within six months apply to have the moneys paid to him, but the onus 
of proof was on him to establish ownership.
26
 When the Act was challenged in Clancy v Ireland, the Supreme 
Court concluded that it amounted to a permissible delimitation of property rights in the interests of the com-
mon good, and therefore was constitutional.
27
 
The model of forfeiture in the 1985 Act provided a useful example for the mechanism currently in place. In-
deed, the 1985 Act was seen to establish a framework for dealing with any future cases of this nature,
28
 and 
it was also described as a 'clear and direct precedent' for the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996.
29
 Moreover, judi-
cial approval of the 1985 Act in Clancy paved the way for the subsequent upholding of the constitutionality of 
the 1996 Act in the Irish courts.
30
 
Now that the procedural aspects of asset forfeiture and the models on which it was based have been out-
lined, whether the mechanism is truly civil or criminal in nature will be considered. 
 
'An ersatz civil proceeding'? 
 
Asset forfeiture may be justified on the basis that an individual should not be allowed to profit from his crime. 
At common law and equity, it is well established that no criminal has a right to benefits which accrue to him 
from crime,
31
 and this maxim has been cited as the rationale behind the Proceeds of Crime legislation.
32
 
However, it is questionable whether this aphorism is applicable in the context of forfeiture under the 1996 
Act, given that a conviction is not necessary for forfeiture to be imposed, and given that the standard of proof 
which the State must satisfy is the civil standard. Therefore, it is arguable that the forfeiture mechanism is in 
fact 'an ersatz civil proceeding' which is 'really a disguise for what [is] truly an attempt by the Oireachtas to 
impose a criminal sanction in a civil context.'
33
 
In determining whether the means of asset forfeiture authorised by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 is truly 
criminal in nature, or whether it merits its title of a civil process, jurisprudence from the superior courts of Ire-
land will be considered below, in addition to that of the US Supreme Court. 
 
Irish jurisprudence 
 
When assessing the nature of the forfeiture proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, the Irish 
courts concluded that the procedures do not have 'all the features of a criminal prosecution', as there is no 
question of the arrest of a respondent or his remand in custody or on bail and there is no specific penalty or 
fine or imprisonment.
34
 The Irish courts have held, using somewhat circular logic, that a procedure is not a 
criminal process if it does not involve certain characteristics, such as arrest and detention. However, it is ar-
guable that it is the very avoidance of these characteristics which facilitates the depiction of forfeiture as civil 
in nature. For example, while the fact that an individual may not be detained under the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 1996 may be cited as evidence that the proceedings are not criminal in nature, it is arguable that the 
classification of the process as civil in nature by the legislature has resulted in the fact that an individual may 
not be detained. 
In addition, the courts followed previous Irish cases which regarded forfeiture in the context of other statutory 
proceedings as civil,
35
 and thereby concluded that 'legislation providing for forfeiture is not necessarily crimi-
nal in nature'.
36
 Furthermore, the Irish courts portrayed the process of assets confiscation as an in rem, ra-
ther than in personam, action, following the decision of the US Supreme Court in Various Items of Personal 
Property v United States.
37
 
Notwithstanding the support of the Irish judiciary for the legitimacy of the civil asset forfeiture, it will now be 
argued that such a tactic should more appropriately be classified as a punishment and as a criminal sanc-
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tion, and therefore should operate in the criminal realm with its associated due process rights and protec-
tions. In determining the true status of asset forfeiture it is useful to adopt the test delineated by the US Su-
preme Court in United States v Ward, which establishes whether a legislative measure is civil or criminal in 
nature.
38
 
 
US jurisprudence: the Ward test 
 
In Ward, the US Supreme Court outlined a two-part test which is of use in determining the status of the Irish 
process of asset forfeiture. First, the court must establish whether the legislature, in introducing the mecha-
nism, 'indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference' for the label of civil or criminal. Secondly, if an in-
tention to establish a civil penalty is established, the court must determine if the statutory scheme was so 
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
39
 
The application of part one of the Ward test to the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 reveals that a punitive intent 
is not explicitly manifest on the part of the Irish legislature. As noted in Enright v Ireland, the intention of the 
legislature may be ascertained from the long title of a statute.
40
 According to the long title of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1996, the Act enables the High Court to make orders for the preservation and the disposal of the 
proceeds of crime, and to provide for related matters: a punitive intention is not discernible in this regard. In 
addition, no punitive intent may be detected in the language or wording of the legislation itself, given that 
there is no use of vocabulary such as 'guilty', 'offence' or 'conviction'.
41
 
However, it is plausible that an implicit punitive intention was evident on the part of the legislature. This con-
tention is supported by reference to comments in the Dáil, such as the 'ultimate aim is not to seize the profits 
of drug trafficking: it is to put drug traffickers out of business altogether'.
42
 Nevertheless, such a remark does 
not conclusively establish that the intent of the legislature was to accord a criminal label to the process of 
asset forfeiture. 
As the application of part one of the Ward test does not indicate that the Irish legislature intended to establish 
a criminal sanction when the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 was enacted, the second facet of this test, which 
centres on the purpose and effect of the measure and seeks to determine if it is so punitive as to negate the 
civil intentions of the legislature, must be considered to determine the nature of the forfeiture scheme. The 
second branch of the Ward test represents a condensed version of that previously elaborated in Kennedy v 
Mendoza, where the US Supreme Court specified various factors which determine whether legislation is pe-
nal or regulatory in character: whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; whether it 
has historically been regarded as a punishment; whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment, namely retribution and deterrence; 
whether the behaviour to which it applies is already a crime; whether an alternative purpose for it exists to 
which it may be rationally connected; and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose.
43
 It is arguable that the application of these criteria to the seizure of criminal assets in Ireland suggests 
that the process is a penal, or criminal, measure. The different factors will now be considered in turn. 
 
Affirmative disability or restraint 
 
The first factor of the Mendoza test, namely whether the sanction imposed by the legislation involves an af-
firmative disability or restraint, has been compared to Hart's condition that punishment must involve 'pain or 
some consequence normally considered unpleasant'.
44
 It appears that this criterion is satisfied in the context 
of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, given that the confiscation and forfeiture of one's assets by definition in-
volves a disability or restraint, as it prevents a person from dealing with his assets, and eventually serves to 
erase any interest he has in them. Nevertheless, serious social and economical consequences for the per-
son concerned do not necessarily imply that the measure must be regarded as a punishment,
45
 and indeed, 
it has been held that the fact that forfeiture is experienced as a punishment is irrelevant to the determination 
of its status.
46
 
Although the effect of the measure on the individual is not decisive in determining whether it is criminal or 
civil, the imposition of a disability or restraint is nevertheless an important factor when taken in conjunction 
with other elements which may indicate that the forfeiture process is criminal rather than civil. It may there-
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fore be contended that the requisite degree of disability or restraint is evident in the asset forfeiture mecha-
nism in Ireland. The second element of the test focuses on whether the sanction has historically been re-
garded as a punishment. 
 
Historical approach 
 
Historically, forfeiture has been characterised as a civil remedy, rather than as a criminal punishment, in Ire-
land.
47
 However, a more ambiguous approach is evident in the US context. As the Irish courts have relied on 
US authorities to support the forfeiture mechanism, recent jurisprudential developments in that jurisdiction 
are particularly pertinent. 
While forfeiture was initially deemed to be a remedial rather than a punitive sanction by the US Supreme 
Court,
48
 in Austin v United States the US Supreme Court concluded that forfeiture is punitive in nature, rely-
ing on the presence of the 'innocent owner' defence to substantiate its conclusion.
49
 This emphasis on the 
culpability of the owner was seen to reveal an intent on the part of the legislature to punish only those in-
volved in drug trafficking.
50
 Similarly, in the Irish context, orders under ss 3 and 4 of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 1996 may not be imposed or may be lifted if there is a serious risk of injustice. This may be compared to 
an innocent owner defence, for if an innocent person can prove that he was unaware of the criminal origins 
of property, he may retain the assets and have the order lifted. Moreover, the logic behind the seven-year 
waiting period before a disposal order could be granted under s. 4 (as it originally was enacted) was to en-
sure that any person who jointly owned property with an individual who was allegedly involved in criminal 
activity would have the opportunity to make a claim that the property was his, rather than belonging to the 
targeted individual.
51
 This suggests that the focus of the order is not the property, but rather the allegedly 
culpable individual, thereby refuting the contention that the orders are in rem.
52
 In other words, guilt is argua-
bly an issue in the context of forfeiture in Ireland, given that individuals who are perceived to be guilty are 
treated differently to innocent people. 
While the historical approach in Ireland has been to regard forfeiture as remedial rather than punitive, the 
decision in Austin is of significance, as there is a comparable innocent owner defence in Ireland. Therefore, 
while the forfeiture process in Ireland does not strictly satisfy this facet of the Mendoza test, it is arguable that 
the change in emphasis in the US is persuasive in this regard. The third factor in Mendoza considers wheth-
er the sanction only comes into play upon a finding of scienter. 
 
Finding of scienter 
 
This element concerns the intent of the respondent, and correlates to the requirement of mens rea for a 
criminal offence. As Bishop observed in 1858: 
[D]isguise the matter as we may, under whatever form of words, if the intent which the owner of the property 
carries in his bosom is the gist of the thing on which the forfeiture turns, then the question is one of the crim-
inal law, and forfeiture is a penalty imposed for crime.
53
 
It is arguable that the scienter criterion is satisfied in the context of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, given 
that the alleged criminal behaviour of the respondent is at the core of the matter. Evidence that the assets 
were accrued as a result of criminal activity or conduct is required before the High Court may make an order 
under the Act, and although the court does not need to establish to the criminal standard of proof that the 
respondent is responsible for criminal behaviour or for a specific criminal offence, this is not fatal to the sci-
enter factor as the blameworthiness of the respondent remains fundamental to the seizure of assets. The 
moral responsibility and social blame that accrue as a result of a determination by the High Court that prop-
erty represents the proceeds of crime indicates that the culpability of the respondent is of import in this re-
gard, thus arguably satisfying the third requirement.
54
 
The next criterion in Mendoza focuses on whether the operation of the legislation promotes punishment's 
traditional aims of retribution and deterrence. 
 
Promotion of punishment's traditional aims 
Page 6 
 
 
It is questionable whether the forfeiture process in Ireland evidences retributive or deterrent objectives, given 
that neither the statutorily defined objectives of CAB
55
 nor the long title of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 
reveal any such aims.
56
 Moreover, it may be claimed that the legislation merely seeks to redress an imbal-
ance by seizing assets accrued as a result of criminal activity and therefore is regulatory in nature. As 
McGuinness J observed in Gilligan, the removal of property that represented the proceeds of crime 'could 
well be viewed in the light of reparation rather than punishment or penalty'.
57
 However, the definition of 'pro-
ceeds of crime' in the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 extends beyond mere profit from crime and rather en-
compasses any property received at any time as a result of or in connection with the commission of an of-
fence, and therefore seems to reach beyond a purely remedial or reparative approach.
58
 As noted above, it 
was claimed in the Dáil that the ultimate aim of forfeiture is not to seize the profits of drug trafficking but ra-
ther 'to put drug traffickers out of business altogether'.
59
 This arguably reveals a retributive sentiment on the 
part of politicians 
Furthermore, forfeiture seems to display deterrent effects, thus fulfilling one of the traditional aims of pun-
ishment. While it has been contended that forfeiture does not act as a deterrent because it merely recoups 
what was not legitimately owned and therefore does not render the individual any worse off than before the 
criminal conduct,
60
 the seizure of the earnings of alleged criminal activities serves as a general deterrent as it 
removes the incentive to commit crime. The possible seizure of one's assets because of a suspicion of crim-
inal behaviour represents an effective deterrent to the commission of crime. Moreover, asset forfeiture may 
also serve as a specific or individual deterrent to any individual whose property has been seized by CAB. 
In addition to the traditional objectives of retribution and deterrence, asset forfeiture also serves punishment's 
aims of censure and incapacitation. As Hart contends, criminal sanctions 'take their character as punishment 
from the condemnation which precedes them and serves as the warrant for their infliction'.
61
 Steiker reiter-
ates this, emphasising that 'blaming' distinguishes criminal from civil measures.
62
 It is clear that the process 
of forfeiture carried out by the Criminal Assets Bureau stems from and embodies the censure of politicians 
and society as a whole towards the suspected actions of the individual who is the target of the action. Fur-
thermore, although forfeiture under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 does not incapacitate offenders in the 
sense that punishment usually does by removing individuals from society, it does seek to incapacitate crimi-
nal organisations and 'reduce their power and influence' by 'divesting major criminals of their ill-gotten 
gains'.
63
 
It is arguable that the fourth element of the Mendoza test is satisfied, given that asset forfeiture in Ireland 
promotes punishment's traditional aims of retribution and deterrence, and that it demonstrates censure and 
serves incapacitative ends. The fifth factor in Mendoza concerns whether the behaviour to which the legisla-
tion applies is already a crime. 
 
Behaviour to which the process applies is a crime 
 
Forfeiture proceedings in the Irish context do not require a conviction, but rather may be applied without a 
finding of culpability in court. Nevertheless, it must be established that the property is the proceeds of crime, 
thereby requiring proof of criminality, albeit on the lower civil burden of proof. This suggests that the behav-
iour to which forfeiture proceedings pertain must be a crime. However, it is not necessary for particular as-
sets to be related to a particular crime, as this would make the Act 'useless and unworkable'.
64
 The activities 
which the Act seeks to combat are primarily the sale and trafficking of drugs, and money laundering, which 
are on the Irish statute book as criminal offences.
65
 It is therefore suggested that the fifth element of the test 
is satisfied in the context of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996. 
The remaining elements of the Mendoza test concern the existence of an alternative purpose for the process 
which does not have punitive aims, and whether the process appears excessive in relation to this alternative 
objective. 
 
Alternative non-punitive purpose 
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The final two considerations concern whether there is a non-punitive purpose that can rationally be connect-
ed to the measure, and whether the measure appears excessive in relation to this alternative purpose. It 
must be conceded that forfeiture does serve non-punitive aims, by seeking to recoup assets unjustifiably and 
illegally acquired as a result of criminal activity. Whether the forfeiture process is excessive in relation to this 
objective is examined below. 
When applying these criteria to an American forfeiture provision, Stahl noted that for a measure to be seen 
as remedial or regulatory, it must not burden property owners any more than is reasonably necessary to 
achieve regulatory ends.
66
 It is arguable that in the Irish context the infringements on the respondent's rights 
to private property are not justifiable, given that his interest in the property may be completely erased by 
means of a disposal order under s. 4 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 after seven years, without a hearing 
to the standard required by the criminal law. However, the Irish courts have held that forfeiture does not 
breach the constitutional right to private property, on the basis that any erosion of the right must be balanced 
against the public interest inherent in the legislation.
67
 In addition, the exigencies of the common good, which 
allow for limitations on the right to property, were interpreted as permitting the use of measures designed to 
prevent the accumulation of assets deriving from criminal activities.
68
 The Act was not seen to attack proper-
ty rights unjustly, given that the State must first demonstrate that the property is the proceeds of crime and 
that an order shall not be made if there is a serious risk of injustice.
69
 
It is questionable whether the infringement on the right to private property is justified, given that such a de-
termination is made on foot of a civil hearing. Moreover, the 'serious risk of injustice' caveat, which has been 
described as a 'vague and intangible yardstick', may not effectively protect the rights of the individual, given 
its imprecise and malleable nature.
70
 Therefore, it is arguable that the forfeiture process is excessive, having 
regard to its aims, as it does not afford the respondent the rights which accrue in the context of a criminal 
trial. 
 
Concluding remarks on the US tests 
 
The approach adopted by the US Supreme Court in Ward and Mendoza assists analysis of the true nature of 
the process under the Proceeds of Crime legislation. Examination of the forfeiture process under this ap-
proach suggests that it is in fact a criminal rather than a civil or regulatory mechanism, and therefore should 
attract criminal due process rights. Indeed, 'civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the 
need' for criminal procedural protections.
71
 Nevertheless, as the US Supreme Court noted in United States v 
Ursery, only the 'clearest proof' of a punitive effect could overwhelm a non-punitive purpose.
72
 While 
Rehnquist CJ conceded that the forfeiture provisions in question had certain punitive aspects, he stressed 
that the provisions served important non-punitive goals, such as ensuring that an individual does not profit 
from his illegal acts.
73
 It is arguable that the satisfaction of the Ward inquiry, in addition to six of the seven 
parts of the Mendoza test, provides the requisite proof of the punitive effect of the forfeiture process, and 
therefore indicates its true nature as a criminal rather than civil process. 
 
Placing forfeiture in a theoretical setting 
 
The development of the CAB and asset forfeiture will now be placed in a theoretical context, in order to illu-
minate the underlying rationale of this tactic. Three theories will be considered in a bid to explain and con-
textualise the introduction and implementation of this approach. First, the issue of whether asset forfeiture 
denotes a shift from due process to crime control imperatives will be examined, using the work of Herbert 
Packer. Next, the possibility that this approach to combating crime represents a move away from criminal 
justice per se to what may be described as criminal administration will be explored. Finally, the categorisation 
of forfeiture as an adaptive response of the State to the phenomenon of crime and the reality of crime control 
in late-modern society will be considered, drawing on David Garland's culture of control thesis. 
 
From due process to crime control? 
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The first element of the theoretical facet of this article focuses on the possibility that civil forfeiture implies a 
favouring of crime control precepts to the detriment of due process. The classic work of Herbert Packer is of 
significant value in this regard. In The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Packer presents two normative models 
of the criminal process--the crime control model and the due process model--which represent the two sepa-
rate value systems which vie for superiority in the criminal process, and which may be used as a framework 
on which an analysis of civil forfeiture may be grounded.
74
 
 
The crime control model 
 
The crime control model views the suppression of criminal conduct as the most significant function of the 
criminal process.
75
 According to this model, efficiency, speed and finality are of primary importance: therefore 
the criminal process should not involve ceremonious rituals that delay the progress of a case. Indeed, Packer 
portrays this model of criminal justice as 'an assembly-line conveyor belt down which moves an endless 
stream of cases'.
76
 Furthermore, the crime control model regards the screening process operated by the po-
lice and prosecutors as a reliable indicator of probable guilt, and sees expert administrative fact-finding 
mechanisms as more reliable and efficacious than formal and adjudicatory processes.
77
 Therefore, minimum 
restrictions should be placed on extrajudicial, informal processes. 
 
The due process model 
 
In contrast, the due process model resembles an obstacle course hindering the progress of the accused 
through the criminal process.
78
 While accepting that the repression of crime is socially desirable, the due 
process model highlights the possibility of error in informal adjudicative fact-finding. According to this model, 
the aim of the criminal process is as much to protect the factually innocent as it is to convict the factually 
guilty: therefore formal adjudicative adversary fact-finding is central, and reliability is of greater consequence 
than efficiency. As official power is susceptible to abuse, a diminution in the efficiency of the criminal process 
is accepted to prevent oppression and to protect the individual.
79
 Furthermore, for the due process model, an 
individual is only guilty if he is found to be factually likely on the basis of reliable evidence to have committed 
the criminal act, and if that determination is made in a procedurally regular fashion by competent authorities. 
Even if the facts indicate that the person is likely is to be guilty, he is not deemed to be so if certain rules de-
signed to protect him and to preserve the integrity of the process are not adhered to.
80
 
 
Applying Packer's thesis 
 
Packer's models are valuable as interpretive devices which allow the introduction of civil forfeiture to be 
conceptualised and analysed. However, despite the usefulness of his thesis as an analytical base, a number 
of problematic issues must be noted. First, it may be argued that his approach is superficial, and that he fails 
to present a thorough examination of the theoretical basis for his opposing models. It has also been claimed 
that the due process and crime control models are not comparable, given that crime control is the overarch-
ing aim of the criminal process, while due process values are procedures which temper that objective.
81
 As 
Smith argues, due process is not a goal in itself, and only acquires a meaning in the context of the pursuit of 
other goals, such as crime control.
82
 
Although Packer's thesis may lack depth to a certain extent, this does not undermine the worth of his models 
in an interpretive sense. Similarly, although the claim that the due process model is not a true procedural 
model has merit, it is submitted that Packer's depiction of the overarching ideologies in the criminal justice 
system surmounts this theoretical shortcoming. Notwithstanding the aforementioned criticisms, Packer's 
normative models provide a useful framework on which an assessment of asset forfeiture may be grounded. 
As Henham notes, Packer's approach is theoretically deficient but heuristically valuable as an empirical 
tool.
83
 
Packer's thesis arguably reveals that the Irish forfeiture model involves a shift away from due process values 
towards the imperatives of crime control. Civil forfeiture, by definition, operates outside and independently of 
the criminal process, but is treated by the State as a further means by which organised criminality may be 
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undermined and tackled. The Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 (as 
amended), which operate in the civil realm with the concomitant lower burden of proof, indicate a realignment 
of the approach adopted by the agents of the State in the fight against organised crime, and demonstrate a 
preference for the needs of the State over the individual's right to due process. By adopting a civil process to 
tackle criminal matters, the State neatly circumvents the need for and demands of due process rights. 
Packer argues that while the validating authority of the crime control model is ultimately legislative and 
proximately administrative, the due process model's validating authority is judicial.
84
 It is evident from recent 
legislative enactments in Ireland and from political discourse that the crime control model represents the ide-
ological basis on which contemporary Irish criminal justice policy is founded, while the tenets of the due pro-
cess approach are more carefully protected by the judiciary.
85
 However, in the context of asset forfeiture ju-
dicial imprimatur has been granted to a technique which serves to erode due process values, thereby sug-
gesting a capitulation by the judiciary to the imperatives of crime control. Challenges to the constitutionality of 
the forfeiture process on the grounds that it breached the due process right of the individual against 
self-incrimination
86
 which is protected by virtue of Article 38.1 of the Irish Constitution, and that it represents 
a criminal action in the guise of a civil one,
87
 failed in the Irish courts, thereby permitting the circumscription 
or evasion of the rights which would usually accrue to an individual in a criminal trial. 
The Irish courts' depiction of asset forfeiture as civil in nature indicates a clear preference for crime control 
over the due process rights of the accused. Consequentially, the needs of the State are favoured to the det-
riment of the individual, with a fundamental alteration of the traditional norms of the criminal justice system. 
Current trends indicate a shift in thinking: no longer is the State the entity from which individuals must be 
protected, rather it is the State that protects us from each other. While due process safeguards sought to 
defend the individual from the might of the State, civil forfeiture circumvents these protections, implying a 
more benign view of State power. 
In addition to the application of Packer's thesis to the tactic of civil forfeiture, which supports the contention 
that due process values are being subsumed by crime control demands, the forfeiture mechanism may be 
explored by reference to the concept of criminal administration. 
 
Criminal administration 
 
The CAB's means of tackling crime under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 has been described by Kilcom-
mins as 'criminal administration'
88
 rather than criminal justice, in which the notion of mens rea is skirted in the 
drive to tackle crime.
89
 Indeed, as Kilcommins first highlighted, the Irish forfeiture procedure is reminiscent of 
the proliferation in the UK and the US in the early 20th century of public welfare offences, which are punish-
able regardless of the state of mind of the actor.
90
 As long ago as 1933 Sayre claimed that the modern con-
ception of criminality was shifting from a basis of individual guilt to one of social danger, and he questioned 
whether this signified the abandonment of the mens rea requirement as an essential element of criminality.
91
 
It is arguable that similar developments are evident in the use of civil forfeiture. Harm, rather than culpability, 
seems to be the focus in this context. Sayre further asked: 'Are we to look forward to a day when criminality 
will be based upon external behaviour alone irrespective of intent?'
92
 It may be argued that civil forfeiture, 
which purports to act in rem rather than in personam, and so focuses on the property rather than on the in-
tent of the respondent, indicates a move towards the state of affairs predicted by Sayre. 
Civil forfeiture may be described as a quintessentially apersonal means of tackling crime, in which emphasis 
is laid on the non-moral and regulatory aspect of the law, indicating a shift in focus away from the individual. 
This mechanism does not focus on individual rights, but rather on societal interests. Indeed, in this context, 
persons may appear only as nuisances to be abated or as objects of regulation.
93
 The fundamental aim of 
the forfeiture process is to neutralise the threat posed to society by organised criminals, rather than seeking 
to rehabilitate or reintegrate individuals according to the traditional principles of criminal justice. 
A further way of conceptualising civil forfeiture is to regard it as an adaptation by the Irish State to the reality 
of crime control in late-modern Western societies. 
 
Adaptation to reality 
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In his seminal work, The Culture of Control, David Garland argues that criminal justice authorities are now 
facing a criminological predicament which influences all policy decisions,
94
 namely that high crime rates are 
now a normal social fact, and that the criminal justice state is seen as limited and ineffective to a great ex-
tent. The recognition that the sovereign state is not capable of delivering law and order and of controlling 
crime on its own results in a predicament for government authorities: while there is a need to withdraw or 
reassess the claim that the State is the primary provider of security and crime control, doing so could be dis-
astrous politically.
95
 Garland regards this predicament as resulting in the formation of 'volatile and ambiva-
lent' policies, each of which may be classified as either an adaptation to reality or denial.
96
 
Adaptive responses include the professionalisation and rationalisation of justice, in addition to more system-
atic information gathering and better caseload management.
97
 Furthermore, in an adaptive measure justice 
may be privatised and commercialised, criminal justice agencies may develop a managerialist ethos with 
new incentives and interests, and the aim of the criminal process may be altered, so that stress is placed on 
incapacitation rather than rehabilitation. In contrast, the non-adaptive response is manifested in a denial of 
the situation, with a reassertion of the myth of the sovereign state and its power to punish.
98
 Reasoned action 
is abandoned by the State, which retreats into expressive mode in a bid to re-establish public confidence. 
The establishment and operation of asset forfeiture in Ireland may be classified as an archetypal adaptive 
response to the problem of organised crime.
99
 The rationale behind the adoption of such a radical tactic 
stemmed from the perception that leaders of organised crime gangs were insulating themselves from the 
traditional methods of prosecution or conviction in the justice system by transferring responsibility for the 
criminal acts to lower-level criminals. Furthermore, the methods adopted by organised criminals were seen to 
have become more advanced and impenetrable to law enforcement agencies, thereby necessitating the 
adoption of a 'radically new and thorough approach' on the part of the State.
100
 As Keane J emphasised in 
Murphy v GM: 
this unquestionably draconian legislation was enacted by the Oireachtas because professional criminals had 
developed sophisticated and elaborate forms of what had become known as 'money laundering' in order to 
conceal from the authorities the proceeds of their criminal activities.
101
 
The introduction of a measure which requires evidence on the civil burden of proof eases the difficulty of 
achieving a successful conviction against an organised criminal. In the Dáil it was stated that: 
[i]f traditional methods fail we must devise new ones. If we cannot punish, deter or reform these people we 
must set a new aim, to stop them from operating their evil trade ... If we cannot arrest the criminals, why not 
confiscate their assets?
102
 
This remark encapsulates the rationale underpinning the adaptive response of the Irish State to the problem 
of organised crime. As the conventional means of criminal prosecution was deemed to be ineffective in the 
face of organised criminality, a new mechanism was devised which eased the burden on the State, and 
which facilitated the control of organised crime in a novel sense. 
Furthermore, the multi-agency nature of the CAB indicates the adaptations made by the State in the fight 
against organised crime. The CAB represents a hybrid of a number of State agencies, including members of 
the Garda Síochána, officials of the Revenue Commissioners and of the Department of Social, Community 
and Family Affairs,
103
 and each member retains the powers that accrue from his original role in carrying out 
CAB business.
104
 The expertise and powers of each member from his particular field is brought to bear on 
the work of the CAB, thereby enhancing the body's capabilities. This represents a further adaptation on the 
part of the State, indicating a recognition of the benefit of innovative measures in tackling organised crime.
105
 
The process of asset forfeiture has the potential to usurp ordinary police work and investigation in the context 
of organised criminality. The approach espoused by the CAB represents a softer option to the normal inves-
tigative process, due to the lower standard of proof, and the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
106
 Neverthe-
less, in Gilligan, the Deputy Commissioner of the Gardaí stressed that the work of the CAB operated in par-
allel to the normal investigating procedures of the Gardaí.
107
 Despite these intentions, it is conceivable that 
the adaptive response of asset forfeiture will become the preferred tactic, given the relative ease with which 
such orders may be granted, when contrasted with the prosecution and conviction of crime. 
 
Conclusion 
Page 11 
 
 
Asset forfeiture in Ireland, which was heavily influenced by the RICO provision in the US, in addition to the 
model under the Offences against The State (Amendment) Act 1985, may rightly be described as a de facto 
criminal tactic, on the basis of its satisfaction of the Ward and Mendoza tests. This mechanism arguably im-
plies a change in emphasis from due process to crime control, with a diminution of concern for individual lib-
erties in the bid to recoup the assets allegedly accrued from criminal activities. Moreover, the growing use of 
asset forfeiture may be categorised as a paradigm shift from criminal justice to criminal administration in the 
context of crime control. Furthermore, the forfeiture process may be classified as an adaptation to reality, in 
which the State seeks to overcome its shortcomings in the realm of criminal justice by the adoption of an in-
novative technique in the form of the civil forfeiture process to combat crime. 
Notwithstanding the potential infringements on the rights of the individual, and the possible imposition of a 
punitive measure in the guise of a civil process, it is unlikely that asset forfeiture will be dislodged from its 
position in the Irish legal topography. It is evident from media reports and political discourse that civil forfei-
ture is seen as the most effective means of tackling the problem of organised crime in Ireland. For example, 
the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in 1998 spoke of 'the outstanding performance and suc-
cess of the Criminal Assets Bureau' in hitting 'serious criminals where it hurts most--in their pockets, bank 
accounts, fancy houses and fast cars'.
108
 Similarly, it was claimed in the Dáil that: 
[t]he establishment of the Criminal Assets Bureau has been one of our success stories in tackling crime... . 
We have for the first time ever, a mass exodus of criminals from this jurisdiction. Criminals are on the run as 
never before. They have gone to ground overseas and elsewhere because their assets are being seized and 
their ill gotten gains, their motivation for committing crime, are being taken from them.
109
 
Furthermore, the Irish Times claimed in 2002 that the CAB has 'virtually eradicated the top echelon of organ-
ised crime' in this jurisdiction.
110
 The resounding popular and political support for civil forfeiture, which has 
also received judicial approval in the face of constitutional challenges, indicates that this process will contin-
ue to be a key weapon in the State's arsenal against organised crime. 
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